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Erresuma Batuaren eta Espainiaren artean antzekotasunak daude, baina baita ezberdintasu-
nak ere. Bi herrialdeak politikaren aldetik asimetrikoak dira. Espainiako erreformak Autonomia
Erkideen onerako izan dira bereziki eta, horrela, asimetria fiskalak ere badaude. Espainian tokiko
hainbat zerga daude, baina Erresuma Batuan udal-zerga baino ez dago. Erresuma Batuak badu zer
ikasirik Espainiako esperientziatik.
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tria eta simetria politikoak. Asimetria eta simetria fiskala. Politikari buruzko ikasgaiak.
Hay similitudes entre el Reino Unido y España, pero también hay diferencias. Ambos países son
políticamente asimétricos. Las reformas españolas han beneficiado principalmente a las Comunidades
Autónomas, llegando así a una asimetría también fiscal. En España hay una serie de ingresos locales,
pero en el Reino Unido sólo existe el impuesto municipal. El Reino Unido podría aprender de la expe-
riencia española.
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Des similitudes existent entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Espagne car ces deux États sont politique-
ment assymétriques, mais également des différences car les réformes espagnoles ont surtout favori-
sé les Communautés Autonomes en les rendant fiscalement assymétriques. L’Espagne connaît en
effet une série de revenus locaux, tandis qu’au Royaume-Uni, il n’y a que les impôts municipaux. Le
Royaume-Uni pourrait apprendre de l’expérience espagnole.
Mots Clé : Espagne. Royaume-Uni. Comparaison. Finances locales et régionales. Symétrie et
assymétrie politique. Symétrie et assymétrie fiscale. Leçons politiques.
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY SPAIN AS A COMPARATOR?
This report will examine subnational funding arrangements in Spain with a
view to drawing lessons for the UK. There are good prima facie reasons why
Spain makes a good comparator for the UK, although there are also important
differences between the two countries which means that care must be taken in
lesson-drawing from one country to the other. 
1.1. Similarities
First, both countries have passed from high levels of political centralisaton to
forms of decentralisation or devolution which, in Spain’s case, has been very
radical and, in the case of the UK, quite significant. 
Second, the ethnic and/or linguistic profiles of the two countries have some
similarities. The Spanish Constitution defines Spain as a “one and indivisible
nation” but also refers to “nationalities and regions”. Although it is not specified
in the Constitution, the “nationalities” are taken to refer to Catalonia, the
Basque Country and Galicia all of which have distinct languages and cultures
and, in the case of the first two, had autonomous political systems before the
Franco dictatorship. Although the UK does not have a written constitution, its
informal constitution recognises that it is composed of distinct nations (England,
Scotland and Wales as well as Northern Ireland), while England is further com-
posed of planning regions. The English planning regions are similar to most of
the Spanish “ordinary” regions in that they have little historical, cultural, linguis-
tic or other basis. 
A third type of similarity is in the process of decentralisation that each
country has adopted. This is both asymmetrical and incrementalist: there were
asymmetries in the kinds of regions and the pace of decentralisation with fast
and slow tracks (see below, Section 2.1). It is not certain whether the Spanish
model of asymmetry and incrementalism influenced the UK devolution process
but there are certainly similarities: the Scottish Parliament with powers of pri-
mary legislation and some tax-raising powers; the Northern Ireland Assembly
with primary legislative powers but no tax-raising powers; the National Assembly
for Wales with powers over secondary legislation and no tax-raising powers; the
proposed English regional government with powers similar to those of the Welsh
Assembly. UK devolution has also been incrementalist with Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland on the “fast track” and with the English regions on the “slow
track”. 
Finally, the decentralisation reforms in both Spain and the UK have been
strongly influenced by membership of the European Union directly, in the sense
that EU regional funding has been an important rationale and motivation for
regionalisation and regional mobilisation as well as indirectly, in the sense that
the principles of subsidiarity and partnership are essential elements of European
“good governance”. These similarities are outlined in Table 1.
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1.2. Differences
There are, on the other hand, a number of important differences between
the two countries, which caution against a direct application of lessons from one
to the other. The most obvious difference is that Spain was an authoritarian dic-
tatorship under General Franco before launching its decentralisation process in
1978. Decentralisation was an essential element of democratisation. Similarly,
both were linked to the prospect of entry into the European Community (as it
then was), which occurred in 1982. 
The UK, on the other hand, while it has experienced a strong tendency
towards centralisation over the past fifty years, is an old-established political
democracy, the basis of which was laid in the 19th century. Second, the “auto-
nomic state”, with a strong role for the autonomous communities, was an essen-
tial feature of the constitutional design of the new Spanish state from the very
start of democratisation. In the UK, devolution is becoming an essential element
of UK constitutional structures, which are still largely dominated by the doctrine
of parliamentary sovereignty. Third, although there are similarities between the
Scottish Parliament and the Spanish ACs, the Welsh Assembly is, and the pro-
posed English regions will be, relatively weak bodies in comparison. Finally, the
Spanish provinces and municipalities are much weaker than their English (or
more generally UK) counterparts, given the powerful position of the Autonomous
Communities.
Table 1. Decentralisation in Spain and the UK: Similarities and Differences
Similarities Differences
Spain UK Spain UK
Regionalised Unitary Regionalised Union From Dictatorship Old Established
State State to Democracy Democracy
Nationalities and Nations and The Autonomic State English Regions will
Regions Regions – Strong role for not have the same
the Regions status and role
Asymmetrical Asymmetrical Weak position of Councils have few
Decentralisation Devolution Provincial and Local revenue sources and
Governments must meet national
standards but still
stronger local tradition
than Spain
Incrementalist Incrementalist
Decentralisation Devolutionary Process
Process
European Dimension European Dimension
Loughlin, John; Lux, Suzannah: Subnational Finances in Spain: Lessons for the UK?
212 Rev. int. estud. vascos. Cuad., 3, 2008, 209-232
2. OVERVIEW OF THE SPANISH TERRITORIAL SYSTEM
Spain is a unitary state with a highly decentralised territorial system, which
has to allow for the cultural, linguistic and historical diversity of its territories.
Decentralisation in Spain has been largely motivated by political and historical
rather than economic factors. The 1978 Constitution tries to balance a concern
with what it defines as the “unity and indivisibility of the Spanish nation” (which
is found in the whole territory of Spain while recognising the existence and rights
of its “nationalities and regions”. The Constitution also guarantees the rights of
the municipal and provincial levels of government. It is this duality of centralising
vs. decentralising forces that has dominated the Spanish transition to demo-
cracy as well as the institutional design of the “autonomic state”. Today, the
autonomic state is accepted by the vast majority of the Spanish people as well
as almost all of the political parties. 
2.1. The Processes of Decentralisation 
There are a number of distinctive features of Spanish decentralisation. First,
we need to distinguish between two different political decentralisations: (i) the
transfer of political and policy responsibilities and functions from the central sta-
te to the Autonomous Communities, sometimes known as “the first decentrali-
sation”; (ii) the transfer of political and policy responsibilities from both the cen-
tral state and the ACs to the provinces and municipalities, sometimes known as
“the second decentralisation”. It is the first decentralisation, which has thus far
been the more important of the two. Basically, the ACs have been the primary
beneficiaries of the reforms while there has been what might be termed a “regio-
nal centralisation”, that is an accumulation of functions, resources and powers
at the AC level. 
There are, however, a number of important differences with regard to both
the nature and the pace of decentralisation to the ACs, in that it has been both
asymmetric and incrementalist (Garcia-Milà, T. and McGuire, T., 2002; Vinuela,
2000). There have been at least two forms of asymmetry present in Spanish
decentralisation. First, there are two distinct regional finance systems: the Foral
Regime, which is found in the Basque Country and Navarre and the Common
Regime, which is found in the other 15. The Foral Regime is based on ancient
“foral” privileges possessed by the Basque Country and Navarre, which gave
them a certain degree of autonomy over tax collection and use and which they
retained, at least to some extent, under Franco. 
Another asymmetry lies in a division made in the Constitution between
regions that were placed on a “fast broad track” (FBT) to devolution and those
that were on a “slow narrow track” (SNT). The FBT regions included the three his-
toric nationalities, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Navarre, Galicia as well as
Andalusia, Valencia and the Balearic Isles (Vinuela, 2000). Thus, the fast track
regions include both the Foral Regime and some Common Regime regions. The
FBT regions were given a broad range of devolved responsibilities immediately,
while the SNT regions would have to wait five years and had to hold referendums
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to have popular approval of AC status. In common with the English planning
regions, many of the SNT regions, such as Extramadura, were created simply for
administrative or statistical purposes and had no historical, linguistic or cultural
basis for their existence. It was thought at the time that some of these regions
may not opt for AC status but, in the end, all did. 
The second important feature of Spanish decentralisation was its incremen-
talist nature. First, there is the difference between the FBT and SNT regions, with
the latter having to wait to accede to the top group. Second, the FBT regions
themselves only achieved full autonomous powers, particularly financial powers,
over a very long period, 25 years in all (between 1978 and 2003). Com pe ten -
cies would be transferred at 5-yearly periods and the transfer was not always
accompanied by the necessary financial resources, leading at times to an explo-
sion of debt on the part of the ACs which had to borrow to meet their commit-
ments. The 5-yearly negotiations came to an end in 2003. All of this introduced
a dynamic into central-regional and inter-regional relations in Spain that, while
justified politically as a way of dealing with diversity, may have been detrimental
from the economic, fiscal and inter-regional perspectives (Garcia-Milà, T., 2003;
Garcia-Milà, T. and McGuire, T., 2002. The first decentralisation came to an end
in 2003, with the completion of the transfer of responsibilities to the ACs and
the harmonisation of the competencies and fiscal arrangements for all the
Common Regime ACs. Thus, the Common Regime passed from asymmetry to
symmetry. There is still asymmetry in that the Foral Regime remains untouched
despite criticisms of its harmful effect on the principles of inter-regional solidarity
(the Basque Country and Navarre, while among the richest regions, pay less into
the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (García-Mila, 2003).
Table 2. Spanish Subnational Government Structure
Autonomous Communities (17)
• Foral Regime (Basque C. & Navarre) • Fast Track (7)
• Common Regime (the rest) • Slow Track (10)
Provinces (50)
Municipalities (8,106)
• 100,000+ inhabitants (55)
• 50 – 100,000 inh (61)
• 10 -50,000 inh. (515)
• 5 – 10,000 inh. (514)
• fewer than 5,000 inh. (6,961)
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2.2. Provinces and Municipalities
Provinces and municipalities have not benefited in the same way as the
autonomous communities from the process of decentralisation and the transfer
of powers. However talks began in January 2002 to examine ways of consolida-
ting and increasing taxation and political powers of the municipalities and provin-
ces. The new financing system which was introduced in 2003, sets the frame-
work for a new sharing of responsibilities and resources between the
municipalities, provinces and autonomous communities. 
3. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES – ACS, PROVINCES AND MUNICIPALITIES
3.1. Autonomous Communities
The transfer of responsibilities to the autonomous communities is based on
the principle that all responsibilities not expressly allocated to the state by the
Constitution are delegated to the autonomous communities.
The main responsibilities of the autonomous communities are as follows:
• internal organisation of community bodies;
• country planning;
• town planning and housing;
• civil engineering (railways and roads);
• management and construction of hydraulic dams;
• agriculture, lakes and forest protection;
• fishing and craft industries;
• economic development;
• culture;
• research;
• promotion of tourism, sport and leisure activities; social welfare.
In addition, the fast track ACs have, since 1978, been responsible for edu-
cation, health and, in the case of the Basque Country and Navarre, the police
force. All the slow track autonomous communities have been responsible for
education since 2000, for health since 2002. Since the end of 2003 the slow
track communities have had all the same responsibilities as the fast track auto-
nomous communities. 
Autonomous communities have powers to legislate in relation to the respon-
sibilities they exercise.
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3.2. Provinces
With the exception of the provinces in the Basque country, the process of
regionalisation has meant that the role and responsibilities of the provinces has
been significantly reduced. Their main responsibility is now to provide technical
and financial assistance to municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants and
to invest in certain services which fall outside the municipal territorial remit, such
as secondary road networks, certain hospitals). They can also take on responsi-
bilities which are delegated by the autonomous community or the state.
3.3. Municipalities
Municipalities have different levels of responsibility for service provision,
depending on their size.
All municipalities are responsible for the following services (regardless of
their size):
• law and order;
• road network maintenance;
• water supply and street lighting;
• waste disposal;
• cemeteries upkeep;
• slaughterhouses;
• heritage assets conservation.
Municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants are in addition responsible for:
• markets and public parks;
• libraries;
• sewerage and waste treatment.
Municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are in addition responsible for:
• emergency and fire-fighting services;
• social reinsertion;
• sports facilities.
Municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants are also responsible for:
• protection of the environment;
• urban public transport.
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4. AC FINANCE SYSTEM
4.1. Background and Reforms
The ACs finance system was set out in pluri-annual agreements established
in the Tax and Financial Policy Council between the central state and the ACs
which have been re-negotiated every five years until 2002, when this require-
ment ceased. The most recent agreement covers the period from 2002-2006
and applies to all ACs with the exception of Navarre and the Basque Country.
After the 2002 reforms of regional government financing, this now operates
according to the following principles (Gómez-Pomar Rodríguez, 2002):
• Stability over time: no more 5-yearly negotiations.
• Universality: the financial regime applies to all the ACs in the Common
Regime.
• Sufficiency, Autonomy and Solidarity: ACs are guaranteed sufficient
resources to carry out their responsibilities in an autonomous way and the-
re is continuing solidarity through the Inter-regional Solidarity Fund (Fondo
de Compensación Interterritorial).
• A widening of fiscal co-responsibility and a reduction of state transfers.
• Co-ordination: there will be new mechanisms of financial co-ordination
between the state administration and the regional administrations and
new financial instruments between the different levels of government.
• Integration of all public services: this follows the integration of health into
the functions now exercised by all the ACs.
These reforms were the culmination of a long-drawn out process whereby
the ACs’ financing system has been moving towards greater autonomy. Although
decentralisation of functions occurred during this period, many ACs argued that
fiscal autonomy did not keep pace with their spending responsibilities (Garcia-
Milà, 2002). There was, nevertheless, a decrease in state transfers, balanced by
an increase in tax receipts. Initially several taxes were transferred from the state
to the autonomous communities, followed by the transfer of a share of the inco-
me tax receipts from state to autonomous community level. However at first the
autonomous communities had no leeway to adjust the rate of the tax. 
Reforms 1997-2002
The 1997 reforms were introduced partly as a result of political negotiations
between minority Madrid governments (PSOE and PP) and nationalist govern-
ments in Catalonia and the Basque Country (in particular Pujol’s nationalist
Catalan government).
These reforms meant that the system changed considerably with the intro-
duction of the ‘tax co-responsibility principle’ which allowed autonomous com-
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munities to benefit from 30 per cent of national income tax receipts. Most
importantly from the point of view of their financial autonomy, the autonomous
communities were given the power to adjust the rates of tax and the tax base,
within certain defined limits. 
2002 Reforms
There were further changes introduced in 2002, again partly a result of
negotiations between the nationalists and the Madrid government, designed to
further increase the tax autonomy of the autonomous communities. 
4.2. Taxes raised by the autonomous communities after 2002
The autonomous communities in the Common Regime have the power to
raise the following taxes:
4.2.1. Personal Income Tax
The personal income tax (impuesto sobre la renta de las personas fisicas -
IRPF) represented over 36 per cent of regional tax revenue in 1997. The ACs’
power to set the tax base and rates increased over the last seven years. In 1997
they benefited from 30 per cent of the income tax revenue raised in their area.
They had the power to set the tax base and could determine levels of rebates
(within certain limits) on half of this sum and received the other half in the form
of a ‘territorial share’. In 2001 their power to set tax rates was extended to cover
the full 30 per cent of income tax receipts. Since the new finance system was
introduced in 2002 (to cover the period 2002-6) the autonomous communities
received both a greater share of income tax receipts (33 per cent) and were
given the power to adjust the tax rates on this share within a margin of plus or
minus 20 per cent of the state tax rate. They are also able to modify the tax base
with tax deductions or rebates.
4.2.2. Complementary taxes on games [i.e. gaming/betting tax?] and on
sewerage
Since January 2002, ACs have a greater power to set the rates of these
taxes within certain limits.
4.2.3. Wealth tax, transfer tax, tax on donations and inheritance
Autonomous communities have been able to levy a wealth tax, a transfer tax
on real estate and a tax on donations and inheritance since 1997. Since January
2002 they have also had the power to set the rates of these taxes within certain
limits.
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4.2.4. Vehicle tax receipts
Autonomous communities have received vehicle tax receipts since January
2002.
4.2.5. Tax on fuels 
In 2002 a local tax on fuels to finance the health sector was also introduced. 
4.2.6. Discretionary Taxes
Autonomous communities may also (at their own discretion) create certain
taxes, for example games taxes (e.g. betting) and taxes on vacant property. To
take a specific example, the AC of Extremadura took the decision in 2001 to
introduce a tax on banks and savings banks. Receipts from the tax, which was
levied at a rate of between 0.3 per cent and 6 per cent of deposits, were inten-
ded to finance investment in regional development. 
Table 3. Main regional own tax revenue
Tax Base Leeway over Rate Weight in regional
revenue excluding
borrowing
Personal income tax 33 % of personal Yes, (within a range of 8%
income revenue more or less 20 % of 
the tax rate set by the 
central government)
Inheritance and Inheritance and Yes 2%
donations tax donation
Wealth tax Assets Yes 1%
Transfer Tax Real estate Yes 5%
transactions
Source: Dexia Crédit Local 2002, Finance in the fifteen countries of the European Union, second edi-
tion (Paris: Dexia, 2002).
4.3. Foral System
As noted above, Navarre and the Basque Country have their own specific tax
raising system. They levy all national taxes but in return pay a subsidy for the
public services provided by the state which is set by an agreement with the state
(concierto for the Basque country and convenio for Navarre). While the Navarre
AC resources are mainly raised by taxation, the Basque Country revenue is deri-
ved mainly from transfers from its three provinces.
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5. PROVINCES
Provinces have relatively limited tax raising powers. They have the power to
levy a surtax on the business tax (recargo sobre actividades económicas) in the
form of a single rate which cannot exceed 40 per cent. The collection level,
however, is the municipalities.
6. MUNICIPALITIES: LIMITED BUT GROWING FISCAL AUTONOMY
6.1. Negotiation of Local Pacts 
Municipalities have benefited less from the decentralisation process than
have the ACs. Negotiations between the central government, ACs and municipa-
lities began in 2002 to improve the situation. The outcome of these negotiations
were the drawing up of local pacts (pactos locales) between the three levels
Because of the structure and the inter-dependent nature of the decentralised
system of government in Spain, any move towards increasing the power for the
municipalities needs to involve both the central government and the ACs, largely
because this involves shifting certain functions from the AC level. The local pacts
are designed to redistribute functions between the three levels of government
with the aim of redefining and broadening the authority of the municipalities.
Although the pacts are not legally binding on any of the levels of government,
they have played an important role in preparing the way for legislative changes
resulting in more power for the municipalities (Ruiz Almendral, V., 2002).
The first local pact was negotiated in the mid-1990s between central
government and the municipalities and resulted in legislative changes in 1998
and 1999 which increased municipal authority. Amongst other changes this pact
dealt with matters such as security in public places, transport and parking and
environmental protection. However, because the first local pact did not involve
the ACs, it was limited in scope because it could not address matters which were
under the jurisdiction of the latter. 
Negotiations on a second set of local pacts began in 2002. These pacts
[were/are being] separately negotiated between the ACs and their municipalities.
The central government also plays an important role as its remit is to define the
general principles governing the shift in responsibilities and authority from the AC
level to the municipal level. It is significant that negotiation of the second series
of pacts began after January 2002, i.e. after the reforms increasing the fiscal
autonomy of the ACs had come into force. This meant that the ACs were no lon-
ger as preoccupied with obtaining further authority for themselves and could the-
refore give more attention to the needs of the municipalities (Ruiz Almendral,
2002). The municipalities have, nevertheless, encountered problems in their
negotiations with the ACs, particularly with regard to the issue of increasing
municipal fiscal autonomy.
An important principle of the local pacts was that the funding for the new
municipal responsibilities should be by way of financial transfers from ACs to
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their municipalities. However it has proved extremely difficult for the ACs and
municipalities to reach an agreement in this regard.
6.2. Municipal taxation
In 1998, municipal tax receipts represented 35 per cent of all municipal
revenue excluding borrowing. Municipalities are able to take advantage of three
mandatory and two optional taxes.
6.2.1. Mandatory taxes
Tax on property (Impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles)
This tax is levied on either buildings or land and represents approximately 47
per cent of municipal tax revenue. Municipalities have discretion over the tax
rate, which is set annually within limits defined by the state. The rates vary
depending on whether the property is in a rural or urban area. 
The tax base is the registered value of the land and buildings. This is deter-
mined by the state and is updated by about three to four per cent on an annual
basis. There is also an individual update for each municipality, with the aim of
bringing the registered value of land in line with market prices.
Business Tax (Impuesto sobre actividades económicas)
This is the second largest source of tax revenue for municipalities. It is levied
on the profits generated by industrial, commercial or artistic activities. The tax
base is made up of a fixed share which depends on the type of activity and a
variable share which is determined by various factors such as the floor space
used, number of employees and electricity consumption. Municipalities can set
their own rates within limits defined by the state and based on their population
figures.
This tax was under threat of abolition by the PP government of Aznar, which
was sympathetic to business and anti-tax. It is still unclear what the position of
the current PSOE government of Zapatero will be, although they will undoubtedly
be less sympathetic to business.
Tax on motor vehicles (Impuesto sobre vehículos de tracción mecánica) 
This is the third largest source of tax revenue for municipalities. They have
limited discretion with regard to setting tax rates or base which are both deter-
mined by the state based on the type of vehicle and its engine power although
municipalities can vary the rate based on the size of their population.
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6.2.2. Optional taxes
Tax on construction, installations and works (Impuesto sobre construcciones,
instalaciones y obras)
This represented 11 per cent of municipal receipts in 1998. It is levied on
the real cost of the construction, installation or works carried out. The minimum
reference rate is set by law and municipalities have a limited power to increase it
in proportion to the size of their population.
Tax on capital gains in urban areas (Impuesto sobre incremento de valor de
los terrenos de naturaleza urbana)
This represents 8 per cent of municipal tax revenue. It is payable on any real
estate transaction and is based on the value of the property in the land register
with an adjustment for the number of elapsed years since the last sale.
Municipalities have a degree of discretion to set rates within state-imposed limits.
Table 4. Main municipal own tax revenue
Tax base Leeway over rate Collection level Weight in local
revenue 
(excluding 
borrowing)
Property tax Land and Yes, within Municipalities 16%
buildings a range
registered value
Business tax Profits from Yes, within a Municipalities 7%
industrial, range
commercial or 
artistic activities
Vehicle tax Vehicles Yes, within a Municipalities 5%
range
Tax on Real cost of Yes, within a Municipalities 4%
construction, the construction, range
installation and installations
works or works
Tax on capital Real estate Yes within a Municipalities 3%
gains in urban transactions range
areas
Total own 35%
resources 
(excl. borrowing)
Source: Dexia Crédit Local 2002, Finance in the fifteen countries of the European Union, second edition (Paris:
Dexia, 2002).
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7. DISCRETION OVER LOCAL TAXES – MUNICIPALITIES AND AUTONOMOUS
COMMUNITIES
The proportion of tax revenue over which autonomous communities and
municipalities have some discretion (i.e. have the power to set the tax rate
and/or base) is:
• 35 per cent for municipalities (as a percentage of total revenue excluding
borrowing);
• 16 per cent for autonomous communities (as a percentage of total reve-
nue excluding borrowing).
8. STATE TRANSFERS – ACS, PROVINCES AND MUNICIPALITIES
State transfers include transferred tax revenue, a general grant and an ear-
marked grant.
8.1. Transferred tax revenue
With the introduction of the new financing system applicable to ACs from 1st
January 2002, these receive 35 per cent of VAT receipts and 40 per cent of
taxes on petrol, tobacco and alcohol. They have no discretion over the applicable
tax rates.
8.2. The general grant
All three levels of local government receive a share of state general receipts in
the form of a general grant (participación en los ingresos generales del Estado).
This corresponds to a percentage of state tax receipts, indexed to the trend in GDP.
The sanitary and social services grant, which was an earmarked grant up
until 2002, has now been incorporated into the general grant.
In terms of the allocation criteria, in the case of ACs, the population counts
for 94 per cent, the area for 4.2 per cent, scattered housing for 1.2 per cent and
insularity for 0.6 per cent. In the case of provinces and municipalities the criteria
used are mainly the number of inhabitants and schools and the tax contribution.
8.3. Earmarked grants
8.3.1. Autonomous communities
Autonomous communities receive operating and investment earmarked
grants. Since 2002, the operating earmarked grants are the grants allocated
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 within the framework of contract-programmes, i.e. programmes designed to sti-
mulate the priority economic development sectors.
The investment earmarked grants include the following grants.
Inter-territorial compensation fund (Fondo de Compensación Inter te rri to rial –
FCI)
This is designed to compensate for inter-regional differences and is intended
to fund local capital expenditure. The allocation criteria include population, net
migration and unemployment. In addition regions must have an average per
capita revenue of less than 75 per cent of the national average per capita reve-
nue level to qualify for this grant.
Grants allocated within investment agreements
These agreements are established between the state and the autonomous
communities and fund joint specific investment projects.
8.3.2. Municipalities
Municipalities receive assigned grants for specific investment projects.
8.4. European Union Grants
Spanish local governments continue to receive grants from the European
Union as part of its regional development policy. Spain is still classified as an
Objective 1 area, which means that the grants involved are considerable. This
funding will continue until 2007.
9. CONTROL OF DEBT
As noted above the level of AC debt has increased dramatically since the
decentralisation process began, largely because fiscal decentralisation did not
keep pace with political decentralisation. 
The central state has set controls on levels of debt and deficit for the auto-
nomous communities to ensure that national aims of achieving a balanced bud-
get are met, as well as ensuring Spain’s obligations under the European Union
Stability and Growth Pact are adhered to. The control measures are set out in the
1980 Regional Finance Act, as well as in the pluri-annual financial agreements
negotiated between the state and the individual autonomous communities.
Aznar’s neo-liberal government introduced further controls on the budget and
debt levels of the autonomous communities by means of the Budget Stability
Act, in force since January 2002, which applies to ACs, provinces and municipa-
lities. This act provides that the granting of authorisations to borrow by the state,
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depends on the AC, province or municipality in question having a balanced bud-
get. In addition, it provides that ACs, which do not maintain a balanced budget
can be fined. 
Table 5. Overview of local revenue by type (as a percentage) 1998
Total Municipalities Provinces Autonomous 
Subnational Communities
Sector
Own tax revenue 27 32 58 20
Financial transfers 55 36 28 67
Other own revenue 10 23 7 6
Borrowing 8 9 7 7
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Dexia Crédit Local 2002, Finance in the fifteen countries of the European Union, second edition (Paris:
Dexia, 2002).
The table above sets out the data for the year 1998. 
10. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR THE UK?
We believe that it is the Review Group, which should finally decide what
lessons might be drawn from the Spanish case study for reforming the UK sys-
tem of local finance and we would recall the important differences between the
two countries outlined at the beginning of this paper. It is useful, nevertheless, to
suggest the five Stoker and Meehan (2003) ‘design principles for a system of
local government finance’ are a good framework within which to assess the
Spanish system and to see what lessons might be derived from it for the UK.
These principles are: accountability, equity, fairness, buoyancy and a ‘holistic
approach’ that encourages ‘joined-up’ working between agencies. To these
might be added in year predictability (how far each option would yield a predicta-
ble revenue stream in a particular financial year) and collectability/administrative
ease/cost are also important considerations. 
Keeping this in mind, we would like to highlight the following features of the
Spanish system, drawn from the literature, which might be of assistance to the
Group in drawing their conclusions. These concern first the process of decentra-
lisation and secondly the substantive features of the taxation systems.
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10.1. Process of Fiscal Decentralisation
Asymmetry: Political vs. Economic considerations
The asymmetrical process of decentralisation in Spain has solved certain
political problems but has created economic and fiscal problems. For instance
the fact that fiscal decentralisation has not always kept pace with political
decentralisation has meant that the autonomous communities have not always
had the resources to meet their increased responsibilities for service provision.
This encouraged a certain amount of fiscal irresponsibility on the part of the ACs,
who had to borrow in order to meet their responsibilities.
Although spending responsibilities and responsibilities for service provision
are now similar for the different autonomous communities, the existence of the
two different financial systems has led to an asymmetry between the Basque
Country and Navarre, on the one hand, and the other fifteen autonomous com-
munities, on the other. It has been argued that the foral regime gives a distinct
revenue advantage to these two regions (Garcia-Milà, 2002) and it has been
estimated that regions under the foral regime enjoy 1.8 times the per capita
funds of the five regions in the Common Regime that have comparable spending
responsibilities (Garcia-Milà, 2002; quoting Castells, A., 2000). Furthermore,
they contribute less to the Inter-regional Solidarity Fund. Whilst the foral regime
has strong historical, political and cultural roots, it is questionable from an eco-
nomic efficiency perspective whether such disparate treatment is justifiable. The
differences have also led to tensions and challenges in the Spanish and
European courts (Darby et al., 2003).
It has been argued that even taking account of the 2002 reforms, the fifteen
autonomous communities in the common regime still have relatively limited tax
raising powers, particularly when compared to the Basque Country and Navarre
(Garcia-Milà, 2003). This has led to inefficient local public spending and excessi-
ve borrowing and limits the choices the regions can make with regard to spending.
Solidarity and equalisation between autonomous communities 
The 2002 reforms were an important step towards greater fiscal autonomy
for all the autonomous communities and resulted in a system of greater simpli-
city and clarity. However, the 2002 reforms did not improve the complexity and
lack of transparency with regard to the question of equalisation and solidarity
between the different regions. There is still a lack of open discussion on this
issue and, in particular, little has been done to establish clear and transparent
equity criteria between regions. This means that the richer regions tend to feel
that they are contributing too much whilst poor regions feel they are receiving too
little (Garcia-Milà, 2003). 
This lack of transparency has resulted in regions attempting to steer reforms
and revisions to the taxation system in a direction that will give them greater
funds.
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Buoyancy/Holism
There are a great variety of taxes in the Spanish system at both regional and
local levels. In some respects, this variety is a positive feature and meets the
recommendation along these lines made by the European Charter of Local Self-
government of the Council of Europe. Some local taxes, in particular, such as the
business tax are recognised as among the most buoyant. The Spanish case illus-
trates that it is possible for a decentralised political system to operate with such
a wide variety of taxes and that this is a strength.
There is, on the other hand, a disadvantage in that the great number and
complexity of the taxes militate against transparency and accountability, particu-
larly as the principle of joint responsibility is now central to the system. This
means that there is no clear line for the citizen between taxation on the one
hand and political decision-making on the other as each level of government can
pass responsibility for difficulties to the other. Furthermore, the complexity of the
system gives greater opportunities for both tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
10.2. Regional and Local Taxation
Focus on decentralisation to ACs
As noted above, the municipalities have not benefited to the same extent
from the fiscal decentralisation process as have the ACs. Although negotiations
are taking place with the aim of increasing the fiscal autonomy of the municipa-
lities in line with their increase in responsibilities, problems have been encounte-
red by the municipalities in reaching an agreement with the ACs on this issue.
The ACs have been reluctant to allow a share of their own funds and financial
authority to be transferred to the municipal level. The local pacts which set the
framework for this proposed transfer of authority have both advantages and
disadvantages. On the one hand they are an important means of defining the
role of the different levels of government. However, because they are not legally
binding, they are dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the different levels
of government including the ACs. Cooperation from the autonomous communi-
ties on the issue of increased fiscal authority for the municipalities has been hard
to achieve (Ruiz Almendral, 2002).
Collectibility/Administrative Ease
It has been argued that Spain has a ‘semi-decentralised tax administration
system’ defined as an economic federation within which there are two institu-
tions at different levels of government with tax administration responsibilities
(Esteller-Moré, 1999). The central tax authority in Spain administers the income
tax (with regional authorities having rate setting powers), whilst the regional tax
authorities have administrative responsibility for the wealth tax, amongst other
taxes. This semi- decentralised system reduces the effectiveness of tax policy for
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two main reasons. Firstly, there are variations in the tax parameters across the
regions which means that certain regions have less ability to counter tax evasion
by means of an increase in audits or the imposition of fines. Secondly, there is a
lack of integration between the different taxation responsibilities of the different
levels of government which also leads to a reduction in effectiveness of tax admi-
nistration. This, reduction, however, in effectiveness has to be balanced against
the advantages of greater regional and municipal fiscal responsibility (Esteller-
Moré, 1999).
10.3. Municipalities
Disparities in tax capacity and fiscal equalisation 
It has been argued that the equalisation grant system in Spain does not suc-
ceed in equalising the differences in tax capacity between the different munici-
palities in Spain, partly because the grant system does not only reward those
municipalities which are prepared to exert a greater tax effort (i.e. set a higher
tax rate) but also (surprisingly) rewards, to some extent, those municipalities
which have a higher tax capacity in the first place (Castells, 2000). This means
that those municipalities which have a lower tax capacity either have to exert an
above-average tax effort (i.e. set a higher tax rate) and/or provide a below avera-
ge level of public services and/or incur higher levels of public debt. It also means
that decreases in levels of tax capacity have to be compensated for by the muni-
cipalities using one or more of these methods. The process of fiscal adjustment
used by different municipalities in the face of a decrease in tax capacity is greatly
influenced by the political situation of the municipality in question. For example,
it has been found that minority governments or those which govern in coalition
tend to delay the adjustment process and are also less willing to raise tax rates
to compensate, choosing to increase their debt levels instead. In addition left-
wing and right-wing governments tend to react differently to variations in tax
capacity, with left-wing governments more inclined to raise taxes to compensate
for a decrease in tax capacity and right-wing governments more willing to reduce
public spending and level of service provision (Castells, 2000).
The fact that the equalisation grant system in Spain does not succeed in
equalising differences in tax capacity and the fact that municipalities vary in how
they tackle both the differences in tax capacity across municipalities and decre-
ases in their own tax capacity leads to variations in levels of service provision and
debt across municipalities. 
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